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I. Introduction
Most of the results in international trade theory have been derived within a barter framework. It has been shown, however, that the introduction of money can alter results obtained within a non-monetary framework. For instance, the dictum of classical trade theory that, for a small open econo my, an improvement in the terms of trade is beneficial does not, in general, hold in the case of a monetary economy (see Kemp [1990] and Palivos and Yip [1996] ).1
There has been some work in the literature on the effects of a tariff with in a general equilibrium model of money (notably, Takayama [1978 and 1981] , Batra and Ramachandran [1980] ). These papers have indu bitably generated useful insights in the analysis of nominal issues, such as the effects of a tariff on the domestic price level, the nominal exchange rate and the balance of payments. However, for analytical convenience, most of these papers assume that commodities and money enter separably in the utility function, which results in the classical dichotomy between the real and the monetary sector. These monetary models behave therefore very similarly to standard barter trade models. For instance, Takayama [1978 and 1981] confirm that for a stable system, where the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied, the Metzler condition is necessary and sufficient to rule out the Metzler paradox, a result shared with standard barter trade models.
In this paper we augment the two country, two-commodity and two-factor model developed by Jones [1969] , by allowing for money to exist as an addi tional asset.2 In particular, we introduce a general cash-in-advance constraint (see, for example, Stockman [1981] ) in which money is not equally effica 1. Other examples include Drabicki and Takayama [1983] and Stockman [1985] . Drabicki and Takayama show that the theory of comparative advantage breaks down in a monetary world under fixed exchange rates when the balance of payments is not in equilibrium. Similarly, in a real trade model with transactions-based demand for money, Stockman shows that changes in inflation can cause changes in the pattern of trade even in the absence of real changes in comparative advantage. 2. See Choi and Yu [1987] for the adoption of the Jones model to study the effects of tariffs.
cious in all markets.3 Put differently, the share of purchases which must be made using cash varies across goods (markets). This introduces a real dis tortion, since the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is not equal anymore to the domestic price ratio, and the classical dichotomy is no longer valid.
We then apply the model to analyze familiar topics in the theory of nominal tariffs such as the Metzler paradox and the effects of tariffs on the terms of trade in the context of a monetary economy. It is found that the Metzler con dition is not both necessary and sufficient to rule out the Metzler paradox, contrary to the conventional conclusion obtained in barter trade models.
Moreover, we re-derive the formula for computing the optimum tariff in the presence of monetary distortions and provide an intuitive economic inter pretation. We find that the standard optimum tariff formula derived in barter trade models understates (overstates) the true one if money is more (less) efficacious in the importable sector.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II provides a detailed description of the basic model and Section III characterizes the terms-oftrade effects of tariffs. Section IV explores the effects of a tariff on the domestic price ratio and discuss the possibility of the Metzler paradox. Sec tion V derives the optimum tariff formula for a monetary economy. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. The Model
Imagine two countries -Home and Foreign -which operate under a float ing exchange rate regime. Both countries are large enough to influence the international prices by manipulating their volume of trade. Each country produces and consumes two internationally traded commodities, named 1 and 2. We use D and X to denote, respectively, demand and production.
Thus, D x indicates the home country's demand for good 1, and X*2 the for eign country's production of good 2. The asterisk, " * "， symbolizes variables 3. Kemp [1990] adopts a static, money-in-the-utility-function (MIUF) model to examine the welfare effects of free trade for small monetary economies. However, due to the generic nature of the MIUF approach, it is difficult to uncover the underlying eco nomic forces that drive his conclusion. We, therefore, employ the CIA model which highlights the transactions motive for the money demand.
for the foreign country. Furthermore, the price of commodity j in the home (foreign) country is denoted by P; (P j)'j = 1， 2.
If we let M denote the stock of money demanded, M the given stock of money, and S a monetary transfer/tax, then the budget constraint for a rep resentative agent in the home country can be written as4
In addition to the budget constraint, (1), the representative agent faces the following cash-in-advance (henceforth, CIA) or liquidity constraint
where ^ e [0, l] The specification 半 ( \ ) 2 is crucial to our analysis and merits farther dis cussion and justification. First, the assumption 本 02 can be considered as the outcome of existing regulations regarding the terms of payments of im ports and the obtaining and use of credit (foreign and domestic) to finance im ports (see Laird and Yeates [199이〉 . For instance, different exchange rates may apply to imports and exports, and there are import sur charges and advance import deposits. The existence of these institutional arrangements is confirmed by the study of Roningen [1978] who constructs 4. According to (1)， the government plays only a passive role in the economy by redis tributing the seigniorage back to the representative agent in a lump-sum fashion. 5. It is assumed that all transactions in the goods market involve seller's money [see Helpman and Razin [1984] for a discussion on different payment systems within a one-good framework]. Moreover, both domestic and foreign supply are assumed to be constant throughout the analysis. 6. This formulation of the CIA constraint is slightly more general than the one consid ered in Stockman [1981] , where = l,j= 1， 2， as well as the one adopted in Lucas and Stokey [1987] , where there are two types of goods, pure cash goods with 0 = 1 and pure credit goods with 0 = 0. Indeed, our formulation of the general CIA con straint can be re-interpreted as modeling the differences in the use of credit financ ing in goods purchases.
a general restriction index and shows that "country practices restricting exchange rates, trade, and payments do affect trade flows among OECD countries" (p. 475). Specifically, the general restriction index coefficients of the regression equation are "statistically significant at the 95% level in 9 out of 14 cases" (p. 473). Second, it can also be viewed as the outcome of exist ing export credits. Table 1 Notes : Non-traditional goods refer mainly to manufactured goods excluding steel, fer tilizers, pulp and paper, which have been traditionally traded on the same basis as primary commodities. They include consumer durables, capital goods and other manufactures. Source: UNCTAD [1992] . 7. A similar argument can be made with regard to necessary and luxury goods.
Reekers [1976] indicates that the ratio of currency and demand deposits to turnover/sales varies considerably from one sector to another. They find that this liquidity ratio is positively related to the share of value added in turnover. We report their findings in Table 2 of all other economic variables, such as the interest rate and the level of income. This, however, contradicts the empirical evidence found in a series of papers (see, for example, Mayor and Pearl [1984] , and Palivos, Wang, and Zhang [1993] ).
In summary, the home country can be viewed as maximizing a utility T able 2 M oney H o ld in g s in P e rc e n t o f S ales fo r S ele cte d Sectors 
where a = ~{dE2/dp) (p/E^) is the terms of trade elasticity of import demand,
A = ~{dE2/dT) (T/E2
) is the tariff elasticity of import demand, and a hat, " 八 " ， is used to denote relative change, that is, for any variable x,x = dx/x.
Using (3)， the change in real income {dY) can be approximated by a change in utility, expressed in terms of the first good, as follows
Furthermore, the tariff revenue in the home and foreign country, ex pressed in terms of the first commodity, is given, respectively, by PE2 -pE2 
= (T-l)p E 2 and {P[E[ -I\ E;)/P;= (T -1)E；/T

Dx + PD2 = X x+ PX2 + (T -1) pE2 ， (6) D[ + = X[ + P*X* + (7* -1)E;/T\ (7)
Consider next the home country's domestic import demand
Differentiating (8) yields
where e = ~(P/E2) (dD2/dP) > 0 describes the substitution effect of a change in P for any given real income and m = P(dD2/dY) is the home marginal propensity to consume the importable good (good 2). In the absence of infe rior goods, 1 > m > 0. Finally, s 三 (P/J?2) (dX2/dP) > 0 captures the substitu tion effect on the production side in response to a change in P.
III. Tariffs and the Terms of Trade
As shown in the Appendix, differentiation of (6) in conjunction with (5) yields the change in real income due to a small change in the tariff rate:
The first term on the right-hand-side is the terms-of-trade effect. The sec ond term indicates the income effect of a change in import demand due to the change in tariff revenue. Finally, the last term captures the novel effect due to the different degree of monetization between the two sectors. The intuition of this novel effect is straightforward. If the importable sector is less distorted by the presence of the CIA constraint (02 < 0X ) , then the MRS
{u2/ u x) is less than the domestic price ratio (JP) according to (3). Since the
MRS is a decreasing function of Z)2, a drop in the consumption of the im portables (dD2 < 0) tends to reduce this gap of divergence between the MRS and the MRT. Thus, it is welfare improving, as implied by (10).
Furthermore, as shown also in the Appendix, substitution of (10) However, if the monetary distortion is severe enough in the importable sec tor so that a is far below unity, then it is possible for the tariff multiplier to be negative; thus, the tariff deteriorates the domestic terms of trade. This result is not difficult to understand. In the case where 02 is much larger than (j)h then the M RS is above P and so an increase in the consumption of importables should be called for. The increase in the tariff rate in this case exacerbates the monetary distortion which can result in a negative tariff multiplier and hence a deterioration of the terms of trade accordingly.
IV. Tariffs and the Domestic-price Ratio
Differentiating P = p T yields P=p + T and upon utilizing (12), we obtain
• . . . a * A» Given a foreign tariff rate, i.e., t = T =0, the elasticity of the domestic price ratio with respect to the tariff iŝ
Assuming that the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied, it follows from (14) 
It is well known (see, for example, Caves, Frankel and Jones [1993] p. 657)
that, in the case of barter trade, a necessary and sufficient condition to rule out the Metzler paradox is the condition a + m > 1, also known as the Met zler condition. Moreover, the same result holds in the monetary model of Takayama〈[1978] and [1981] ). In our framework, however, since a can be greater or less than one, depending on whether 也 is greater or less than 02 , this result is in need of a revision. In particular, the Metzler condition is necessary and sufficient to rule out the paradox if and only if 0! = 02-In the more likely case, however, where ^ ^ 02, and hence 1, this result does not hold. More specifically, if > 02, or a > 1, then the Met zler condition is only necessary to rule the Metzler paradox. If, on the other hand, < 02» or a < 1, then the same condition becomes sufficient. We sum marize our findings as follows:
Proposition 1: I f ^ ^ 02 then the Metzler condition is not both necessary and sufficient to rule out the Metzler paradox. I f ( \ > x > 02 it is necessary while if < (^ it is sufficient
V. The Optimum Tariff
In barter trade models, the terms of trade move in favor of the tariffimposing country if the latter is large enough to influence the world prices.
This tends to increase national welfare due to the exploitation of a country's monopoly power in the world market. At the same time, however, a tariff impairs productive efficiency and tends to lower welfare. It follows that there exists a unique tariff rate, known as the optimum tariff, at which national welfare is maximized. This optimum tariff is given by 1/ ( 찌 1) so that a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimum tariff to be posi tive is that there exists a range of the foreign offer curve where a > 1. In this section we derive an analogous formula for the optimum tariff for our monetary economy.
First rewrite equation (12) 
a -1 J (1 + (화 )s + (1 + 02) 숀 If 也 = 02， with the barter economy being a special case, (20) reduces to the standard formula for the optimum tariff. In the case of non-uniform mon etization, the optimal tariff becomes higher (lower) if > (<) 02. In fact, if < 02 the optimal tariff may be negative even in the elastic range of the for eign offer curve. The explanation to this modified formula is quite intuitive.
For instance, if money is more efficacious in the importable sector so that 0! > 02» then our discussion in section 3 implies that a decrease in the con sumption of the importables (D2) is welfare improving since it reduces the gap between the MRS and the domestic price ratio. In this case, an increase in the tariff rate serves the purpose of reducing D 2 which leads to a higher optimal tariff the standard barter one. We summarize our finding in the fol lowing proposition.
Proposition 2 9. See Palivos and Yip [1997] for further details for the small country case.
To conclude the paper, notice that our way of introducing money into the world economy via a cash-in-advance constraint models money as a demandside distortion. Hence, the presence of money in our model creates a diver gence between the M RS and the domestic-price ratio. There has been a con siderable number of studies in the literature which model money as a factor of production -the so called "money-in-the-production" approach (e.g. , Wang and Yip [1992] ). If we adopt such an approach to introduce money into the world economy, then money creates a supply-side distortion and so we conjecture that it will create a divergence between the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) and the domestic-price ratio. This may provide fur ther insights into the role of money in international trade issues and we intend to tackle this in future work.
International Economics 30; pp. 49-68.
Appendix
Derivation of (10).
Differentiating (6) (10) 
Derivation of (11).
Differentiation of P = PT yields P-p-\-T. Substituting this and
adD2 = E2 {-[e + (m /T )] p -eT + {m t/T )E 2},
where a = l-[m(02-0 i) / (1 + 0i)] >0. Substitution of (A3) into (A2) results in (11).
Derivation of (19).
Differentiating 
Derivation of (20).
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